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ABSTRACT
Fuzz testing is a software testing technique that has risen to prominence over the past two
decades. The unifying feature of all fuzz testers (fuzzers) is their ability to somehow automatically
produce random test cases for software. Fuzzers can generally be placed in one of two classes:
black-box or white-box. Blackbox fuzzers do not derive information from a program’s source or
binary in order to restrict the domain of their generated input while white-box fuzzers do. A tradeoff
involved in the choice between blackbox and whitebox fuzzing is the rate at which inputs can be
produced; since blackbox fuzzers need not do any “thinking” about the software under test to
generate inputs, blackbox fuzzers can generate more inputs per unit time if all other factors are
equal.
The question of how blackbox and whitebox fuzzing should be used together for ideal
economy of software testing has been posed and even speculated about, however, to my knowledge,
no publically available study with the intent of characterizing an answer exists. The purpose of this
thesis is to provide an initial exploration of the bug-finding characteristics of blackbox and whitebox
fuzzers. A blackbox fuzzer is implemented and extended with a concolic execution program to make
it whitebox. Both versions of the fuzzer are then used to run tests on some small programs and
some parts of a file compression library.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Real-world software applications are often very complex in nature, and in practice these
applications nearly always contain bugs in their implementation. This is more-or-less unavoidable
because software is often implemented by many different humans, and typically represents a much
larger system than can have all of its details fully conceptualized at once.
Given this, some method of eliminating errors in software implementation is usually
considered necessary to deliver a reliable software product. The primary method used in practice
today is software testing [1]. However, software testing labor intensive, and mostly done by human
beings doing things such as manually writing unit tests. Because of these two factors, software
testing is very expensive, and it is common for software testing costs to be 50% or more of a
software project’s total expenses [1].
The high costs mentioned have provided substantial motivation for the utilization of more
automated testing techniques to reduce costs. One of the techniques that has risen to prominence in
recent years is often called “fuzzing.” The exact definition of fuzzing is often stretched, but in
general fuzzing entails giving a piece of software a large number of randomly generated test cases—
usually several orders of magnitude more test cases than a human can write manually. Blackbox
fuzzing refers to randomly generating inputs for software under test with little or no consideration
of the software under test’s inner workings. Even though it is a relatively unintelligent technique in
nature to utilize, blackbox fuzzing’s brute force methodology has found success finding bugs in
some major software projects [2].
Although fuzzing often produces useful testing results, its effectiveness can be improved
substantially by letting it “know” more about the software under test. Much research effort as of late
1

has been done with this very goal in mind; it is felt that by making the “dumb” blackbox fuzzer
“smarter,” or more whitebox, that even more software bugs can be found without human
interaction.
In this research, this topic of making a blackbox fuzzer smarter and more whitebox is
investigated. A blackbox fuzzer is implemented in C++ that can provided a very large amount of
randomly mutated inputs to a program being tested. Following this, the blackbox fuzzer is loosely
integrated with a concolic analysis engine that knows how to produce concrete inputs to exercise
large numbers of reachable C program branches. Using the standalone blackbox fuzzer and the
fuzzer integrated with the concolic analysis engine, a compression library is tested.
Motivation
An issue often brought up by those familiar with the topic of Fuzzing is what kind of
tradeoff should be made between rate of test case generation and the amount of computational
analysis given to test cases on average [1]. If much computational time is given to analyzing the
target program to generate test cases, each test case may on average be good at finding a bug in the
program, but it is possible that not enough test cases will be generated to fully exercise the code
covered, or it may be possible that only parts of the program that can be effectively analyzed will be
tested due to limitations of current whitebox fuzzing techniques available to the public [2].
What seems to be absent from current research on fuzz testing is a thorough and scientific
evaluation of available techniques on a common problem set. One group of Berkeley students
attempted this in 2008 [3], but acknowledged that they were “not able to make a solid
conclusion” because no data on timing was kept.
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Thesis Organization
In Chapter 2, background information on software testing and fuzzing will be provided to
aid the reader in understanding the research presented. In Chapter 3, a comparison of fuzz testing
techniques is presented, including justification for experimental design choices. In Chapter 4,
conclusions are drawn from the results obtained in Chapter 3 and discussed.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Background on Fuzzing and Automated Randomized Testing
Fuzz testing is a conceptually simple yet undeniably potent automated black-box testing
technique for software first described by Miller et al. in 1989 [4]. Like many technology metaphors,
the word “fuzz” reflects an intuitive analogy to its definition; fuzz testing traditionally refers to
giving a program a large amount of completely random input (fuzz) while monitoring for program
failures of various types. Despite its appearance as a “dumb” approach to software testing, simple
black-box fuzz testing has surprised and is continuing to surprise software testers and researchers
with its effectiveness in a wide variety of domains including testing Unix utilities, finding security
flaws in Adobe Reader X, and discovering limitations of malware detection engines [4] [5] [6] [7].
Eventually, fuzz testing rose to prominence as both a popular testing tool, as seen in the Month of
Browser Bugs [8], and as a part of several software companies secure development lifecycles,
including Microsoft’s [9], Adobe’s [10], and Cisco’s [11].
However, it is rather obvious that black-box fuzz testing has serious limitations. Consider
the following C-style code fragment:
if (x == 357)
function1();
else
function2();

Assuming x is a 32-bit integer, fuzzing x with purely random values would almost always
cause function2() to be executed. Conversely, function1() has an underwhelming 1 in 232 chance
of being tested in a given instance because x must equal exactly 357 for that branch to be taken.
Cases such as these, which are common, are especially problematic when doing random testing of
highly structured inputs such as file formats. In such a scenario, an overwhelming majority of cases
4

may fail early in the execution path because of failed checksums or improper values in headers that
may be dependent on each other.
Automated black-box testing solutions to this problem of overwhelming rejection of inputs
have been proposed and implemented, but at the expense of the ideal of testing being truly
automated. Since the solutions require testers to build descriptions of the file format being tested,
this type of testing often proves cost prohibitive, especially in scenarios in which no description of
the file format is published or requires reverse engineering. An analogous situation exists for
network protocols.
This issue that exists without the previously mentioned labor expenditure of building input
descriptions, commonly referred to by saying a technique exhibits poor or shallow code coverage,
has not gone unnoticed by researchers. Several well-known papers in the past ten years have made
contributions to what is now called “white-box fuzzing,” leading the definition of fuzzing somewhat
astray from its purely random roots [9] [10]. Leveraging both static and dynamic code analysis
techniques, these papers have demonstrated some cases where more sophisticated white-box fuzzing
techniques have a substantial advantage over black-box fuzzing without the upfront labor cost of
designing a grammar or structure for a black-box fuzzer. Of particular note, Microsoft developed
and internally deployed the whitebox fuzzer SAGE [12], which they claim has made their software
testing substantially more productive.
Despite the endorsement of Microsoft and others, however, an informal survey of
published guides and workshops on the Internet reveals little evidence that white-box fuzzing
techniques have gained traction with software testers; searches of Black Hat, Infosec, Microsoft, and
Defcon turned up little mention of using publically available tools for white-box fuzz testing. Blackbox tools such as The Peach Fuzzing Platform [13] and the now rather dated SPIKE continue to be
5

the focus, with the exception of formal research. This is in spite of the fact of the demonstrated
advances in white-box testing in terms of both effectiveness and automation.
Concolic Execution
Concolic execution is the execution of a program both concretely and symbolically [14].
“Concolic” is a combination of the words “concrete” and “symbolic.” Concrete execution is simply the
execution of a program using a specific input. Symbolic execution [15] involves solving conditions for
branching in general.
Symbolic execution requires that the symbolic values of program variables and path
conditions be stored for each branch in a program [16]. Exploring all of the possible branches of a
program is accomplished by creating and systematically negating path conditions, and then using a
constraint solver such as Z3 [17], inputs are generated that guarantee exercising of each path.
Concrete and symbolic execution can be well explained by using a simple example adapted
from the paper describing Symbolic Java Pathfinder by Pasareanu et al. at NASA [16]. Consider the
following code fragment and corresponding symbolic execution tree:
[1] int x, y, result;
[2]
if (x > y)
[3]
result = x - y;
[4]
else
[5]
result = y - x;
[6] assert (result > 0)
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x: Sym(x), y: Sym(y)
PC: true

[1]

x: Sym(x), y: Sym(y)
PC: Sym(x) > Sym(y)

[1]

x: Sym(x), y: Sym(y)
PC: Sym(x) <= Sym(y)

[2]

[4]

x: Sym(x), y: Sym(y)
result: Sym(x) - Sym(y)
PC: Sym(x) > Sym(y)

[5]

x: Sym(x), y: Sym(y)
result: Sym(x) - Sym(y)
PC: Sym(x) > Sym(y) AND
Sym(x) - Sym(y) > 0

x: Sym(x), y: Sym(y)
result: Sym(y) - Sym(x)
PC: Sym(x) <= Sym(y)

[5]

[5]

x: Sym(x), y: Sym(y)
result: Sym(x) - Sym(y)
PC: Sym(x) > Sym(y) AND
Sym(x) - Sym(y) <= 0

x: Sym(x), y: Sym(y)
result: Sym(y) - Sym(x)
PC: Sym(x) <= Sym(y) AND
Sym(x) - Sym(y) > 0

[5]

x: Sym(x), y: Sym(y)
result: Sym(y) - Sym(x)
PC: Sym(x) <= Sym(y) AND
Sym(x) - Sym(y) <= 0

Figure 1: Symbolic execution tree corresponding to program above
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On a given concrete execution, only one particular leaf of the possible executions in the tree
will be reached. If, for instance, x was set to be 5 and y was set to be 3, path 1 would be exercised.
The major advantage of concrete execution over symbolic execution is that no potentially
computationally expensive constraint analysis is needed to be performed to exercise the given path.
The disadvantage of concrete execution is that in practice, it may be unevenly cover code, for
instance, in the situation of hand-writing unit tests or doing blackbox fuzzing.
The symbolic execution generalizes the conditions upon which each branch is taken, and the
generalized path constraints are shown in the boxes. At each branch, the generalized values of
variables are used to generate the path constraints necessary to take one side of the branch. The path
condition is negated and solved for to take the other branch. The advantage of symbolic execution is
great—it can often generate test cases that cover all possible branches of a program. However, it has
two major drawbacks. First, it can be difficult to symbolically reason about items such as floating
point values and memory pointers [18]. Second, symbolic execution quickly becomes a
computationally intractable problem as the number of branches in a program increases [19]. The
number of unique execution paths in a program can grow exponentially with the number or
branches, or can even grow without bounds in the case of some loops. This is often called path
explosion or state explosion [18].
Literature Review
Since the inception of the idea of fuzz testing in the late 80’s at the University of WisconsinMadison, the key motif in research has been to improve the idea of randomized (fuzz) testing by
effectively making it less random. The first large step towards this goal has been the creation of
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grammar-assisted blackbox fuzzers such as the aforementioned SPIKE and Peach Fuzzing Platform.
However, grammar-assisted fuzzers also often have large labor costs associated with their operation.
Research has been done to mitigate the costs associated with doing grammar-assisted
blackbox fuzzing, a notoriously difficult task for some undocumented protocols; for instance,
Samba, which provides file and print services for various Windows clients using Unix-like operating
systems, took over a decade to develop [20] because of the lack of information on the protocols it
utilized. Cabello et al. developed Polygot in 2007 as one of the first steps towards reducing these
costs [21]; instead of focusing on packet data, Polygot derived information from network protocols
via dynamic analysis of the binaries using the protocol. Though effective, one significant criticism of
this method is that it only revealed a “flat” structure of the protocol being analyzed rather than its
truer hierarchical one. Lin et al. proposed an improvement to this in 2008 by noting that different
protocol fields in a given message are normally handled in different execution contexts [22].
However, if Microsoft’s success with white-box fuzzing is a good indicator, the future lies
with this approach. Whitebox fuzzing has often been based on combining fuzz testing, concrete
execution, and symbolic execution into one tool [18]. Research in the mid- and late-2000’s
strengthened the prospects of using concrete and symbolic (concolic) execution in practice for
software testing by addressing limitations of the technique such as exponential path explosion [23]
and imprecise pointer reasoning [24], enabling some fuzzers to exercise a large number of execution
paths of programs while still being automatic with their input generation.
Overall, the present situation seems to be that fully randomized blackbox fuzz testing and
concolic whitebox fuzz testing represent extreme points on a spectrum of computation required per
test case generated. The former does no analysis and applies all computational resources to writing
new test cases. The latter devotes a substantial proportion of required CPU time to analyzing the
9

tested program in an attempt to maximize the number of execution paths exercised with its fuzzed
inputs. However, Ganesh et al. have developed a whitebox fuzzer called BuzzFuzz that represents
an intermediate between the two aforementioned techniques [25]. Although both concolic fuzzers
and BuzzFuzz derive information about variables from a program’s source and concrete runs,
BuzzFuzz does so in a simpler, less computationally intensive way. Concolic fuzzers maintain logical
expressions for each variable that may become very complex, while BuzzFuzz simply relates sets of
input bytes to program variables using a technique called “taint analysis.” Although not as well
suited for exhausting all possible execution paths, BuzzFuzz’s techniques may be more effective in
some scenarios because it can generate test cases at a higher rate than concolic testers.
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CHAPTER 3: TESTING SOFTWARE USING A BLACKBOX AND WHITEBOX FUZZER
Experimental Design
Architecture of This Experiment
The experiment consists of two separate fuzzing sessions with as many factors controlled as
possible besides the method of generating fuzzer seed inputs. Both the blackbox and whitebox
fuzzing sessions are run for a set number of iterations. Each iteration consists of the fuzzer running
the software under test on a particular fuzzed input, the fuzzer monitoring the software under test
for a crash, and finally recording data on what happened. Every iteration, the following data is
recorded:


The cumulative number of iterations performed by that point in time



The cumulative number of crashes encountered by that point in time



The wall clock time elapsed

Additionally, upon a fuzzed input causing the software under test to crash, the following
information is recorded in addition to the previously mentioned data:


The signal terminating the program



The input that caused the program to be terminated



The file from which the input terminating the program was derived
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Choosing Fuzzers
Certain requirements must be met to ensure the best possible accuracy of results. First, the
fuzzers chosen should represent the state of the art as closely as is possible. Second, some method
of controlling for duplicate bug discoveries must be used.
Choosing software that best represents the state of the art is a process that mostly concerns
the whitebox fuzzer. The ideal whitebox fuzzer for this experiment will have implemented more of
the research advances in whitebox fuzzing than other available software. Determining which
particular fuzzer this is entails tabulating all of the available whitebox fuzzers, performing a literature
review of advances in whitebox fuzzing, and evaluating which of the fuzzers implements the most of
these advances. Other restrictions such as being able to accurately keep time data on when bugs are
found and licensing also must be considered.
Choosing a blackbox fuzzer is less involved since the basic methodology of blackbox fuzzing
has, by its definition, remained static relative to whitebox fuzzing. The only requirement of the
blackbox fuzzer is that it does not experience any unnecessary performance bottlenecks.
With regards to choice of both the blackbox and the whitebox fuzzer, a preliminary
restriction is that the software is available for academic use. There exists commercial software fitting
the definition of a whitebox fuzzer, however the software is not advertised as being available for
academic use. There have also been whitebox fuzzers written as proofs of concept for particular
research publications, but that have not been released publically [25]. Finally, what is perhaps the
most advanced whitebox fuzzer in existence, and for which much of the research contributing to
advances in whitebox fuzzing technology was funded for, Microsoft’s SAGE is only used internally
at Microsoft.
12

The ability to log data on when bugs were found is also necessary. Without this ability, it is
not possible to characterize what bug-finding over time looks like using different fuzzing techniques.
This turns out to be an important restriction because one of the most technically advanced concolic
testing tools available for academic use, Microsoft Pex, was not designed with this capability, and
cannot be modified to be able to keep track of time data because of its closed source nature.
For this experiment, custom built “one-off” blackbox fuzzer is used for two reasons. First,
adapting a pre-built fuzzer to keep timing data was judged to take more effort than simply building
the logic into a new fuzzer. Bottlenecks in I/O performance were also able to be avoided by only
keeping track of data necessary for the experiment. Written in native C++, it spends minimal time
calculating input mutations, effectively randomly generating input at maximum speed. Second,
custom-writing the blackbox fuzzer allowed more parallels in design to be drawn between the
blackbox and whitebox fuzzing techniques, allowing for a better comparison between the two.
A custom whitebox fuzzer design was also used for this experiment. The ability to do
concrete and symbolic analysis was a must for this experiment, which, it appears, narrows the
candidate software to Microsoft Pex and JPF-Concolic. Neither of these two testing engines
supported gathering timing information, so a simple extension to CREST was written instead.
Controlling For Multiple Crashes from One Bug
It is possible, and often likely, that multiple crashes of the program under test will be
associated with the same bug in the program’s source code. Consider the following C# code
fragment:
In the code fragment above, any time the argument “position” exceeds the size of the array
“array,” the program will crash because array boundaries are checked at runtime in C#. If the size of
13

static int getElement(int position)
{
return array[position];
}

the array is 5, then the sequence of inputs {2, 6, 8, 1, 3, 10, 12} will trigger 4 program crashes.
However, all 4 of these crashes were caused by a single bug: not checking to see if position was
within the array’s boundaries.
Since the number of bugs discovered by a fuzzer is a better metric of performance than the
number of crashes it causes, it is useful to have a method of counting these 4 crashes as only 1 bug
discovery. This makes sense because bugs cause program crashes, not the other way around.
The method used for controlling for multiple crashes caused by a single bug is hashing the
stack traces of terminated programs. A script is used to automatically process all of the core dumps
produced from the software under test in a particular fuzzing session and determine which stack
traces are the same. This information is used to change the data on crashes over time into data on
unique bugs found over time.
In practice, however, this technique was never employed in the experiments conducted
because both fuzzing techniques failed to cause program crashes.
Blackbox Fuzzer Design
The custom blackbox fuzzer used in this experiment is traditional in design in the sense that
it can provide purely random input to a compiled target software under test, although if needed it
could do random mutations of an input file. For performance reasons, a lightweight software under
test monitor is integrated into the design of the fuzzer so that an external program such as OllyDbg
does not need to be used. The program monitor is discussed further in the next section.
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In short, the blackbox fuzzer takes input data from all of the files in a specified directory.
Then, for each input file, a set of fuzzed inputs is derived and provided to the software under test.
During each execution of a fuzzed input, the software under test is monitored for operating system
kill signals. Depending on whether or not the software under test is terminated, appropriate
information is recorded by the test monitor component of the fuzzer. A high-level design diagram
illustrating the blackbox fuzzing process follows.
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Input

Record Relevant Data
on Crash

gcc
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Output

SoftwareUnderTest

program status

New Iteration

Input

SUT Monitor/Driver

Killed by OS?

Fuzzed
Random
Input

Output

SoftwareUnderTest.c

Fuzzed Input Generator

Figure 2: High-level design of the blackbox fuzzing session
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Random
Input

Software Under Test Monitor Design
The software under test monitor (SUT monitor) was a component integrated into both the
blackbox and whitebox fuzzer. A primary design goal of the SUT monitor was to solve the
following two problems faced by the Berkeley undergraduates in their fuzzing research [5]:
1. Lack of accurate data on the time taken to trigger each individual crash
2. Poor storage performance

17

Figure 3: High-level design of the software under test monitor component

To solve the problem described in item 1 above, the SUT monitor places the current wall
clock time associated with a crash into the log file output buffer in addition to any information
needed to reconstruct the crash later. This information can later be aggregated to determine
information such as, but not limited to, the rate at which crashes occur, the rate at which bugs are
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found, or the susceptibility of the software under test to being crashed by a fuzzed input in terms of
approximate clock cycles per crash.
The problem described in item 2 above is approached by using the paradigm of accessing
the hard disk as infrequently as possible. This is done at the architectural level of the entire fuzzing
process, but some elements of this paradigm are reflected in the implementation of the test monitor.
To this end, only enough information is recorded to forensically reconstruct a crash later on if one
occurs. The idea here is to only record information that is absolutely necessary to minimize the
amount of writing done to the disk. Referring to figure 3, this can be seen by noting that the “Killed
by OS?” branch skips a process in the common case of the software under test not crashing.
Several other optimizations could have been done substantially further improve the problem
described in item 2, but they were left for a later project.
Whitebox Fuzzer Design
The whitebox fuzzer used in this research was designed as a simple extension to a concolic
testing tool, CREST-Z3 [26]. CREST-Z3 was selected as the tool to be extended for several reasons.
First, it fulfills the requirement that it can reason about the software under test in a (mostly)
automated fashion. Second, to my knowledge, CREST has not been studied for its usefulness
substantially outside of the initial research paper it was introduced in; another paper that used
CREST could not be found by a rudimentary search using academic search tools, and the number of
downloads that CREST has on its hosting site indicate that it has a very small user base. Third, in
the paper that it was introduced in, CREST was not applied to fuzzing, making the experiments here
somewhat novel.

19

The overall idea in the design of the extension is that although CREST’s concolic testing
produces excellent code coverage, it does not exercise the covered code very well because of the
nature of the techniques employed. Adding a fuzzing stage to CREST provides advantages over
both purely concrete fuzzing and also the concolic testing techniques that CREST uses. The
advantage over blackbox fuzzing is that, because seed input represents valid input exercising a wide
variety of branches, this extension to CREST may be able to trigger bugs in code that would
otherwise be unreachable through blackbox fuzzing. The advantage over using CREST by itself is
that sometimes more test input values will be tried on a given branch. This provides a substantial
advantage over using CREST alone because CREST does not attempt to reason about parts of C
programs that often cause errors such as array indices and arithmetic not important to branching. A
simple example of these advantages are shown in the “uniform_test” experiment in the next section.
A high-level overview of the entire whitebox fuzzing process used can be seen in the
diagram that follows. Basically, after the software under test is hand instrumented, and then
compiled by CREST, CREST is used to generate high-coverage input files to the software under
test. These input files are given to the fuzzer, which fuzzes them in memory and provides the results
to the software under test as input. Identically to the blackbox fuzzer, the whitebox fuzzer then
monitors the software under test for a crash and records appropriate data.
Components of the whitebox fuzzing process that are in addition to the blackbox fuzzing
process are highlighted in green in the diagram.
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Figure 4: High-level architecture of the whitebox fuzzer
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However, this technique has a limitation that stems from its simplicity. This technique makes
the assumption that slightly changing a set of input values will not simply cause frequently exercised
branches to be exercised more instead of further exercising lesser-used branches. However, this
assumption could very well be false in the general case if, for instance, the software under test is
given a file with a checksum as input. A better implementation would have been to integrate the
fuzzed input generation procedures with CREST’s branch coverage routines, but this would have
been a far larger undertaking.

Experiments
Experiments are divided into two sections: small benchmarks and large benchmarks. Small
benchmarks consists of easily understandable, small programs that demonstrate some characteristic
of the testing techniques utilized in this research. Small benchmarks are not intended to be realistic
measures of testing technique performance. Large benchmarks are benchmarks are real-world
programs that better represent the complexity of typical, useful software. Large benchmarks should
be too complex to realistically automatically cover using any available techniques. Notably, this
means that all branches should not be able to be covered using only CREST, the fuzzer, or a
combination of the two.
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Small Benchmarks
uniform_test
uniform_test.c is a small program designed for the purpose of demonstrating a branching
structure that is impossible to explore with a blackbox fuzzer, but can be easily explored with a
concolic whitebox fuzzer such as the one used here. If variables a, b, c, and d are chosen randomly,
as they are with the blackbox fuzzer, the most nested print statement will execute during
approximately 1 in every 2(32∗4−2) = 2126 executions, or approximately once every7.9 ∗ 1027 years
at this benchmark’s execution rate of 340 times per second.
uniform_test.c contains one purposefully included bug at its deepest branch. The entire
program, including instrumentation to work with CREST, is shown in the code segment below:
#include <crest.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(void) {
int a, b, c, d, e;
CREST_int(a);
CREST_int(b);
CREST_int(c);
CREST_int(d);
CREST_int(e);
if (a > 5 && a < 10) {
if (b == 19) {
if (c == 7) {
if (d == 3) {
printf("Some values will cause a crash.\n");
d = d / (e % 10);
}
}
}
}
if (a < 9) {
printf("No problem here.\n");
}
return 0;
}
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Although good for demonstrative purposes, uniform_test.c does not necessarily represent a
realistic software under test scenario. The program is small, makes use of no external libraries, and
has a very obvious bug in it. Nonetheless, the fuzzing results are presented for comparison. Both
fuzzers were run for 70,000 iterations.

uniform_test.c: Crashes Triggered Over Time
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Figure 5: Graph of crashes triggered over time for uniform_test.c

The results indicate that the whitebox fuzzer was able to trigger the planted bug very often
while the blackbox fuzzer was unable to trigger the bug, as expected by the preceding analysis.
Although unrealistic as mentioned, this example is what established the plausibility of concolic
whitebox fuzzing being more efficient than blackbox fuzzing early on in this research.
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The behavior of the “(Whitebox) Crashes Triggered” curve is notable. Flat sections indicate
times when the fuzzer was using input files that covered branches far from the bug. Increasing
sections indicate that an input file that covered the most nested branch with the bug contained was
being fuzzed.
nonlinear_solution.c
The reason why CREST was extended to use the Z3 theorem prover instead of the one it
was originally designed with is that Z3 can handle solving nonlinear equations that CREST’s original
theorem prover could not reason about. nonlinear_solution.c was written as a small test simply to
verify that Z3 functioned. nonlinear_solution.c is shown in the code segment that follows.
#ifdef CREST
#include <crest.h>
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
//takes x as first argument, y as second argument
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
#ifdef CREST
int x, y;
CREST_int(x);
CREST_int(y);
#else
int x = atoi(argv[0]);
int y = atoi(argv[1]);
#endif
if ((y * y) % 50 == x) {
if (x > y + 10) {
y = y / 0; //bug
} else {
printf("No bug on this line\n");
}
printf("Success.\n");
}
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
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CREST was able to identify all 4 branches in this small program and was able to concolically
produce output that exercised all 4 branches.
Large Benchmarks
Several pieces of software were considered for testing in these experiments. Linux standard
utilities have been commonly exercised in automated software testing research [1] [27], making them
an obvious first choice, however the labor involved in instrumentation, verifying the correctness of
the instrumentation, and configuration of these utilities became too labor intensive for the scope of
this research. In this respect, grep, ul, tsort were considered. A JPEG compressor was also
considered for use, but its heavy use of floating point arithmetic made it a poor candidate for using
static analysis on, which in our case does not possess very good reasoning abilities with regards to
floating point calculations. Miniz, a compression library was eventually selected to be used as a
benchmark.
Miniz
Miniz is an open source compression library. It was selected as a benchmark because it
possessed a large number of branches, could be easily modified to take input straight from memory
instead of through files slowly written to the hard disk, and because it could be configured for
instrumentation and compiling within a reasonable amount of time—approximately 10 hours.
Two of Miniz’s features are tested: its ability to compress and decompress a string, and its
ability to parse a zip file. Because Miniz is not a standalone program, for each feature to be tested, a
small driver program is written.
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Traditionally, fuzzers of file processing programs such as Miniz produce a set of fuzzed files
to be consumed by the file processing software under test. However, it was found that substantial
fuzzing performance improvements could be made by having Miniz “read files” from memory
instead of from disk, thus allowing millions of test cases to be produced in a short period of time.
As will be seen, the included code for the test drivers reflect this design; no file reading functions are
included and instead data already in memory is compressed and decompressed.
Miniz String Compression and Decompression: Experiment Setup
For both blackbox and whitebox testing, a test driver was used to process input and to pass
fuzzed input to the appropriate functions in Miniz. For blackbox testing, the test driver took 70
characters as a single argument and passed the 70 characters to a string decompression function.
During blackbox fuzzing, the fuzzer simply calls the compiled test driver with a random 70 character
argument repeatedly. The resulting compressed string was then passed to a decompression function.
For whitebox testing, the 70 characters in the argument were marked as symbolic using the
CREST_char(char x) function. CREST then reasons about these 70 bytes in order to produce sets

of inputs that will exercise as many program branches as possible. The input sets produced by
CREST are then used as seeds by the fuzzer to produce a large amount of concrete test input for the
test driver.
The test driver used for this experiment is shown in the code segment that follows. The only
difference in code between the blackbox and whitebox test driver is that a #define CREST line is
included above int main(int argc, char *argv[]).
Miniz String Compression and Decompression: Experiment Results
The blackbox fuzzing session produced 1,500,000 fuzzed inputs for the test driver.
However, no crashes were triggered, and, as such, not much can be drawn from these results.
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typedef unsigned char uint8;
typedef unsigned short uint16;
typedef unsigned int uint;
#define INPUT_SIZE 70
#define ARGUMENT_TO_USE 0
#ifdef CREST
#include <crest.h>
#endif
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
// copy the characters in
char symIn[128];
memcpy(symIn, argv[ARGUMENT_TO_USE], INPUT_SIZE);
#ifdef CREST
//mark all input characters as symbolic
int charIndex;
for (charIndex = 0; charIndex < INPUT_SIZE; charIndex++)
CREST_char(symIn[charIndex]);
#endif
int src_len = strlen(symIn);
uLong cmp_len = compressBound(src_len);
unsigned char *pCmp, *pUncomp;
// Allocate buffers to hold compressed and uncompressed data.
pCmp = (mz_uint8 *) malloc((size_t) cmp_len);
pUncomp = (mz_uint8 *) malloc((size_t) src_len);
// Compress the string then decompress it
uLong uncomp_len = src_len;
compress(pCmp, &cmp_len, (const unsigned char *) symIn, src_len);
uncompress(pUncomp, &uncomp_len, pCmp, cmp_len);
printf("Success.\n");
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}

The whitebox fuzzing session produced 1,500,000 fuzzed inputs derived from 71 seed inputs
produced by CREST, including the original seeds themselves. CREST recognized 2440 possible
branches that could be taken along the execution path provided by the test driver. By themselves,
the seeds exercised 452 of these branches. However, no crashes were triggered by any of the fuzzed
inputs.
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Although good quantitative data cannot be derived from this experiment, this experiment
qualitatively indicates that this type of concolic fuzzing was not effective on this benchmark.
Miniz Zip File Decompression: Experimental Setup
Miniz’s Zip file decompression logic was tested similarly to the string compression and
decompression instance. A test driver was written that handled the fuzzed input and passed it to the
appropriate function. For blackbox testing, the test driver took 20 bytes as a single argument and
passed the 20 bytes to the Zip decompression function. During blackbox fuzzing, the fuzzer simply
calls the compiled test driver with a random 20 byte argument repeatedly. For whitebox testing, the
20 byte argument to the Zip decompression function are instead marked as symbolic using the
CREST_unsigned_char(unsigned char x) function. CREST then reasons about these 20 bytes in

order to produce sets of inputs that will exercise as many program branches as possible. The input
sets produced by CREST are then used as seeds by the fuzzer to produce a large amount of concrete
test input for the test driver.
The test driver used for this experiment is shown in the code segment that follows. The only
difference in code between the blackbox and whitebox test driver is that a #define CREST line is
included above int main(int argc, char *argv[]).
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#include <crest.h>
#define INPUT_SIZE 20
#define ARGUMENT_TO_USE 0
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
unsigned char* compressed_data_ptr;
unsigned char* output_ptr; //our "compressed data", i.e. fuzzed input
compressed_data_ptr = (unsigned char *) malloc(INPUT_SIZE); //pointer to where
the compressed data is in memory
const size_t out_buf_size = INPUT_SIZE * 10; //output buffer size
output_ptr = (unsigned char *) malloc(out_buf_size);
const size_t src_buf_size = INPUT_SIZE; //source buffer size
const unsigned int flags = 0;
#ifdef CREST
int i;
for (i = 0; i < INPUT_SIZE; i++)
CREST_unsigned_char(compressed_data_ptr[i]);
#endif
//read the specified amount of data into the buffer
memcpy(compressed_data_ptr, argv[ARGUMENT_TO_USE], INPUT_SIZE * sizeof
(unsigned char));
tinfl_decompress_mem_to_mem(output_ptr, out_buf_size, compressed_data_ptr,
INPUT_SIZE, flags);
printf("Success.\n\n");
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}

Miniz Zip File Decompression: Experimental Results
The blackbox fuzzing session produced 1,500,000 fuzzed inputs for the test driver.
However, no crashes were triggered. As such, not much can be drawn from these results.
The whitebox fuzzing session also produced 1,500,000 fuzzed inputs, however, in operation,
it was in effect the same as the blackbox fuzzing session. CREST recognized 2410 possible branches
that could be taken along the execution path provided by the test driver. However, CREST was only
able to symbolically solve for one 20 byte input that exercised 33 branches. Similar to the blackbox
fuzzing session, the fuzzed inputs derived from the single input that CREST produced did not
trigger any crashes.
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Although good quantitative data cannot be derived from this experiment, the experiment
does qualitatively demonstrate limitations of the techniques employed by CREST.
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CHAPTER 4: AN EXPLORATORY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Since economics is the focus of this mathematical analysis, factors beyond those of
computational efficiency are considered, different from the focus of the rest of this research. These
economic factors turn out to be critical; in the United States, the cost of software engineering labor
is very high. Depending on their exact classification, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that
software developers typically make $44.85 to $49.30 per hour as of 2012 [28]. In order to have useful
data on factors related to labor, my own experiences will be measured. This method, although not
highly scientific, provides an interesting initial exploration of the problem examined.
The Full Process Used For Blackbox And Whitebox Fuzzing
This section will introduce the different steps involved in the blackbox and whitebox fuzzing
process, and thus, the precise factors I will measure and do analysis on. As is mentioned elsewhere
in this research, there are generally other tradeoffs associated with the use of a whitebox fuzzer over
a blackbox fuzzer besides efficiency of test case generation. Whitebox fuzzers often also take a notinsignificant amount of additional labor to setup and use on a particular piece of software under test.
Gantt charts comparing the blackbox and whitebox fuzzing process used in this research follows,
not to scale to any quantitative data.
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Figure 6: Gantt charts of the blackbox and whitebox fuzzing processes
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As can be seen in the Gantt charts above, the primary difference in cost between blackbox
and whitebox fuzzing in my experiments is the cost of symbolically instrumenting the software
under test. This cost is large for a number of reasons. First, it requires manual analysis, and
sometimes modification, of the software under test to determine where inputs are actually reduced
to primitive data types that can be reasoned about with the concolic execution engine used. Second,
verifying that the symbolic instrumentation worked properly takes a substantial amount of manual
testing itself, and in my experience the failure rate was high; often even if the proper stack variables
were marked as symbolic, CREST-Z3 would be unable to effectively reason about the program
structures encountered.
Modelling the Process of Blackbox and Whitebox Fuzzing
In this section, the individual details of the blackbox and whitebox fuzzing process that was
used in my research will be modeled. For each step shown in the Gantt charts, some tendencies of
that process will be explained, and a reasonable model of this process will be chosen. At the end of
the section, each constituent model will be combined to reason about the generalized simplified
economic problem of finding software bugs.
Configuring The Software Under Test To Accept Arbitrary Input
A necessary goal of the fuzzer implementation completed in this research was that it needed
to be higher performance than most common fuzzers because tests were done on limited
computational resources. One of the primary performance optimizations was to, at a high level,
design fuzzing routines to use the host computer’s hard disk as little as possible. A primary ways this
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was carried out was by making substitute “stub” methods for the software under test’s file
input/output operations. In the course of this research, this was done at least a dozen times.
Creating these stub methods amounted to the following process:
1. Identify all file input/output procedures relevant to the part of the software being
tested
2. Replace any file input streams with an input stream that the fuzzer could use to
provide random data to the program
This task, by nature, was both technical and tedious. A table of the approximate labor
expenditures for programs of varying sizes in lines of code (LOC) is presented as follows:
Lines
of Code
20
50
30
15
10000
26000
4900

Labor Expenditures
(Hours)
0.25
0.5
0.15
0.1
3
4
3

Table 1: Labor costs of configuring software under test to accept arbitrary input

A scatter plot was produced using spreadsheet software of the data in the table. A qualitative
graphical examination of the scatter plot indicated that the data was logarithmic in nature, and so a
logarithmic curve was fitted to the data. The scatter plot and the fitted curve, y = 0.5103ln(x) 1.4096, follows:
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Figure 7: Labor costs of configuring software under test to accept arbitrary input

Writing The Fuzz Test Driver
For the purposes of this research, it can be assumed that the fuzz test driver does not need
to be engineered from scratch. Although it is true that one was custom-engineered for this research,
it only had to be slightly modified for each software under test. The process of writing the fuzz test
driver is outlined as follows:
1. Compose the proper Linux execve() arguments to launch the software under test
with fuzzed inputs
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2. Make sure that the method’s internal code reflects the correct data types being used
in the arguments
Because the test driver needed the same process to be done each time, the time was constant
for each software under test. A table and graph is provided for consistency:
Lines
of Code
20
50
30
15
10000
26000
4900

Labor Expenditures
(Hours)
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5

Table 2: Labor costs of writing fuzz test drivers
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Figure 8: Labor costs of writing fuzz test drivers
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25000

30000

As seen, a linear curve is fitted for consistency. It is simply y = 0.5 hours.
Symbolically Instrumenting Software (Whitebox Fuzzing Only)
Symbolic instrumentation of software represents the most difficult process covered here
form both a math modeling standpoint, and a technical standpoint. As is mentioned in the section
of this thesis on concolic execution, input data for a concolic-based whitebox fuzzer must be
reasoned about symbolically. However, because of the innate computational intractability of this
problem in general, and the relatively recent nature of the scientific developments of methods to
cope with this intractability, only a small number of important inputs must be marked as symbolic to
be reasoned about by the concolic execution engine. For a large variety of reasons that are beyond
the scope of this research, evaluating every input symbolically and algorithmically would be
impossible.
In the experiments presented in this research, a large degree of parallelism was kept between
blackbox fuzzing sessions and whitebox fuzzing sessions so that they could be compared as
scientifically as possible. Software under test inputs that would be randomized (fuzzed) in the
blackbox session would be marked symbolic in the whitebox session. Refer to the following section
for a simple example of how this was done using preprocessor directives: Chapter 3 > Experiments
> Small Benchmarks > nonlinear_solution.c
There are three main challenges in designing a symbolically-marked version of a
piece of software. First, for many programs, a large amount of analysis must go into designing a
method of introducing a small amount of input that will not be rejected early in the stages of the
program. This is not a “cookie-cutter” problem, and as such, a large degree of variation is seen in
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how long programs take to instrument. The reasons for this are discussed in Chapter 2 >
Background on Fuzzing and Automated Randomized Testing. Second, the size of the symbolically
marked input must be optimized for. We want the symbolically marked input to be as large as
possible, however, increasing the size too much either makes the symbolic execution intractable or
crashes CREST-Z3. The latter factor could have been eliminated with substantially more work on a
reengineered concolic execution engine. Third, even after symbolic execution is implemented for the
software under test, often it is found to be in vein because the concolic execution engine cannot
reason about the program structures tested, thus leaving the work so far as wasted. A full discussion
of the limitations of current concolic execution and theorem proving techniques is beyond the scope
of this research, and to my knowledge, would require a new literature review to be conducted on the
topic because of the fast pace of change in this research area.
For the purposes of this paper, the latter challenge mentioned—that sometimes
software cannot be analyzed using a concolic execution engine, wasting all the labor used thus far—
will be termed risk of concolic analysis failure (RCAF). This term is introduce to simplify this
math modeling problem slightly. In reality, we simply cannot do the concolic analysis if it fails.
However, we will approximate this by assuming we have lots of software to test, and that our
expected labor expenditure is as follows:
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 =

𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
1 − 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒

RCAF will be left as a variable in the complete model because it will vary greatly depending
on the type of software being tested. For instance, numerical analysis routines would have an RCAF
approaching 0, but small, integer calculation programs would have an RCAF close to 1. In the
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course of my experiments, my RCAF was approximately 0.5. My observed RCAF of 0.5 is reflected
in the following table and graph:
Lines
of Code
20
50
30
15
10000
26000
4900

Expected Labor Expenditures
(Hours)
0.3
0.4
0.2
0.2
30
50
20

Figure 9: Labor costs of symbolically instrumenting software under test
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Figure 10: Labor costs of symbolically instrumenting software under test
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A linear trendline was chosen to reflect the fact that increased program complexity (in terms
of lines of code) will increase the amount of labor needed for symbolic instrumentation. Factoring
out the included RCAF, the equation found for the trendline is:
𝐿𝑂𝐶
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 0.001 ∗ (
) + 2.868
1 − 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝐹
Fuzzing Software
Fuzzing the software is an automatic part of the entire process described here. As such, it
has no labor cost associated with it. For this reason, I will simply say that it has associated with it
some small capital cost of either owning or renting the computers that will run the fuzzing
sessions. In an organization doing regular software testing, these machines will likely be constantly
utilized, and thus not useful for other activities. Capital cost will simply be specified as a variable in
the complete model.
Tabulating Unique Software Bugs
In my experience, tabulation of unique software bugs could be done mostly automatically. I
will not go into the technical details, but effectively, a very professional fuzzing setup will be able to
use certain fuzzer optimizations, crash dumps, development utilities, and scripting to determine the
uniqueness of each item in a very large set of crashes. In the case of this research, the
aforementioned system was custom-engineered due to the lack of a suitable available alternative. For
the purposes of modelling, we will assume that such a system is available prebuilt.
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Using such a system to obtain a “list” of unique bugs took me constant time in practice.
That is, it took me approximately two hours to use the automatic tools built earlier to produce this
“list” in each fuzzing session. A chart and graph is provided for consistency:
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Lines
of Code
20
50
30
15
10000
26000
4900

Labor Expenditures
(Hours)
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Table 3: Labor costs of tabulating unique software bugs
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Figure 11: Labor costs of tabulating unique software bugs

A Complete Model
Our final model will be in terms of cost, typically the most important metric in a commercial
software engineering environment. At a high level, this will be done by simply adding the labor costs
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of the previously described processes and multiplying by the cost-per-hour of a software engineer to
do the work.
There is a large amount of transferable labor overlap between the blackbox and whitebox
fuzzing routines; indeed, the only difference between the two is that the whitebox fuzzing routine
described here requires the additional step of symbolically instrumenting the software under test. As
such, I believe that the most interesting problem to approach is the following: Given cost estimates
of both blackbox and whitebox fuzzing routines, is the work differential associated with whitebox
fuzzing an acceptable cost?
To answer the latter question, the complete cost model of both blackbox and whitebox
fuzzing will be created. Following this, they will be related using an inequality. Cost of labor (COL)
will be defined as the hourly wage of a software engineer performing the work.
Blackbox Model
The complete model of the cost of blackbox fuzzing is the sum of the following items, all of
which were discussed in the preceding sections:
1. COL multiplied by the number of hours of labor needed to configure the software
under test to accept arbitrary input
2. COL multiplied by the number of hours of labor needed to write the fuzz test driver
3. The capital cost associated with being able to run the fuzzing session
4. COL multiplied by the number of hours of labor needed to tabulate the unique
software bugs
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According to the analysis done in the preceding sections, in equation form, the mathematical
model the monetary cost of blackbox fuzzing is the following, where ExpectedCost is the function
defining the expected cost of software testing in US Dollars:
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐿𝑂𝐶, 𝐶𝑂𝐿, 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡)
= 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚1 + 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚2 + 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚3 + 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚4
= 𝐶𝑂𝐿 ∗ (0.5013 ∗ ln(𝐿𝑂𝐶) − 1.4096) + 𝐶𝑂𝐿 ∗ (0.5) + (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 𝐶𝑂𝐿 ∗ (2)
= 𝐶𝑂𝐿 ∗ (0.5013 ∗ ln(𝐿𝑂𝐶) + 1.0905) + (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡)
Using this model, consider the example of testing the file decompression library used as a
benchmark in Chapter 3 > Experiments > Large Benchmarks > Miniz exactly as it was in the
research. In this case, LOC is 4900, COL is (reasonably) assumed to be $47.00, and Capital Cost is
assumed to be $25. These values produce the result $276.45 using the model above. Thus, it is
estimated to cost $276.45 to discover however many bugs are found using this technique.
Whitebox Model
The complete model of the cost of whitebox fuzzing is the sum of the following items, all of
which are the same as in the blackbox model except item 3:
1. COL multiplied by the number of hours of labor needed to configure the software
under test to accept arbitrary input
2. COL multiplied by the number of hours of labor needed to write the fuzz test driver
3. COL multiplied by the number of hours of labor needed to symbolically instrument
the software under test
4. The capital cost associated with being able to run the fuzzing session

45

5. COL multiplied by the number of hours of labor needed to tabulate the unique
software bugs
According to the analysis done in the preceding sections, in equation form, the mathematical
model of the monetary cost of whitebox fuzzing is the following, where ExpectedCost is the
function defining the expected cost of software testing in US Dollars:
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐿𝑂𝐶, 𝐶𝑂𝐿, 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡, 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝐹)
= 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚1 + 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚2 + 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚3 + 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚4 + 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚5
= 𝐶𝑂𝐿 ∗ (0.5013 ∗ ln(𝐿𝑂𝐶) − 1.4096) + 𝐶𝑂𝐿 ∗ (0.5) + COL ∗ (0.001 ∗ (

LOC
)
1 − RCAF

+ 2.868) + (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 𝐶𝑂𝐿 ∗ (2)
LOC
= 𝐶𝑂𝐿 ∗ (0.5013 ∗ ln(𝐿𝑂𝐶) + 0.001 ∗ (
) + 1.7775) + (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡)
1 − RCAF
Using this model, consider the example of testing the file decompression library used as a
benchmark in Chapter 3 > Experiments > Large Benchmarks > Miniz exactly as it was in the
research. In this case, LOC is 4900, COL is again assumed to be $47.00, Capital Cost is assumed to
be $25, and RCAF is assumed to be 0.5. These values produce the result $769.34 using the model
above. Thus, it is estimated to cost $769.34 to discover however many bugs are found using this
technique, almost three times as much as blackbox fuzzing.
Cost Differential Model
Now that we have models for how much blackbox and whitebox fuzzing, it would be useful
to have a model for knowing the increase in cost for doing whitebox fuzzing in addition to blackbox
fuzzing. Such would be an important cost to consider if, for instance, blackbox fuzzing did not
produce useful enough results and a project manager was considering implementing the more
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rigorous, but expensive, whitebox fuzzing routine. A predicted number of bugs to be found would
also need to be found, as would the expected cost of these bugs to the organization producing the
software, but these factors represent a far more complicated problem that will not be explored here.
Assuming that both a blackbox and whitebox fuzzing session is ran, whitebox fuzzing items
1 and 2 have already been completed, and do not need to be factored into the increased cost.
However, the costs associated with items 4 and 5 will be reincurred. Item 3 is not completed in the
blackbox session. Given this, the cost of running a whitebox fuzzing session after having already
completed a blackbox fuzzing session on a given piece of software under test is the sum of the
following:
1. COL multiplied by the number of hours of labor needed to symbolically instrument
the software under test
2. The capital cost associated with being able to run the fuzzing session
3. COL multiplied by the number of hours of labor needed to tabulate the unique
software bugs
In equation form, based on the analysis in the preceding two sections, this increase in cost is
modeled by the following equation:
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐿𝑂𝐶, 𝐶𝑂𝐿, 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡, 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝐹)
= 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚1 + 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚2 + 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚3
LOC
= COL ∗ (0.001 ∗ (
) + 2.868) + (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 𝐶𝑂𝐿 ∗ (2)
1 − RCAF
LOC
= COL ∗ (0.001 ∗ (
) + 4.868) + (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡)
1 − RCAF
Using this model, consider the example of testing the file decompression library used as a
benchmark in Chapter 3 > Experiments > Large Benchmarks > Miniz exactly as it was in the
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research. In this case, LOC is 4900, COL is again assumed to be $47.00, Capital Cost is assumed to
be $25, and RCAF is assumed to be 0.5. These values produce the result $714.39 using the model
above. Thus, it is estimated to cost $714.39 to discover however many additional bugs would be
found with whitebox fuzzing.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this research, a simple blackbox and whitebox fuzzing system was built and used to test
Miniz, a file compression and decompression library. Although the fuzzers built here were higher
performance than ones used in similar endeavors [3], the large number of test cases generated did
not trigger any bugs in Miniz’s compression and decompression routines. To this end, it can be
concluded that neither of the techniques implemented here are effective at finding bugs in Miniz’s
compression routines. CREST has been demonstrated as a good tool for several scenarios [22], but
its application in the situation presented in this particular experiment was not very successful. That
is, although bugs were not found within the scope of these experiments, these results pertain only to
the experiments conducted here; it is entirely possible that the techniques used here would be
effective at finding bugs in software other than the ones considered here.
Two factors likely contributed to the result found in these experiments. First, it seems that
Miniz is an exceptionally robustly written piece of software considering its very small user base.
Second, CREST was unable to reason about Miniz’s compression and decompression routines very
well. As was mentioned in the experiments section, CREST was able to exercise only 33 branches, a
single execution path, in Miniz’s decompression routine. An inspection of the decompression
routine reveals that memory pointers are used extensively, something that CREST is unable to
reason about. This is likely what kept CREST from producing useful input for the program.
Three factors were identified during testing that likely could have substantially increased the
effectiveness of the whitebox fuzzer presented here. However, pursuing any of these three things
would have been far beyond the scope of this research. First, the fuzzer could have been more
closely integrated with the branch-coverage algorithms and the utilized theorem prover, Z3. This
presents itself as a source of potentially more complex, but novel research topics. Second, CREST49

Z3 could have been extended to be able to reason about floating-point operations better, which
would have allowed it to be used on the JPEG converter that was discarded as experimental
software. Research has been completed and is available on how this can be done [28]. Third, CREST
could have been modified to be able to reason about memory pointers better; poor memory
reasoning is the suspected reason why CREST failed to concolically generate test cases for the
second Miniz experiment. Research is also available on how this can be accomplished [29].
In addition, a simple exploratory analysis of the monetary tradeoffs associated with blackbox
and whitebox fuzzing was completed. This analysis is effectively the business problem
complementary to the research problem focused on in this thesis. Three models were derived for the
techniques presented in chapter 3: a model for the monetary cost of blackbox fuzzing a piece of
software, a model for the monetary cost of whitebox fuzzing a piece of software, and a model for
the cost associated with whitebox fuzzing a piece of software after blackbox fuzzing had already
been completed.
Although not highly scientific in nature, the modeling done in chapter 4 could potentially be
extended and used as the framework for a higher-quality publication in the future.
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APPENDIX A: SOURCE CODE
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fuzzer.hpp
/*
* File:
fuzzer.hpp
* Author: toby
*
* Created on March 1, 2013, 6:00 PM
*/
//
//
//using namespace std;
#ifndef FUZZER_HPP
#define
FUZZER_HPP
#define DEBUG 1
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include

<cstdlib>
<cerrno>
<cstring>
<cerrno>
<dirent.h>
<limits.h>
<time.h>

#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include

<iostream>
<fstream>
<stdlib.h>
<string>
<vector>
<sys/stat.h>
<sys/wait.h>
<unistd.h>
<sstream>

using namespace std;
//using std::string;
//using std::ofstream;
//using std::strerror;
//using std::cerr;
//using std::endl;
class Fuzzer {
public:
/*_fuzzTargetPath: command to call the target program
_sessionRoot: a path where multiple sessions will be stored. Will contain
input files and folders for the results of various runs
_sessionName: the name of the folder that this fuzz session's results
will be stored in*/
string sut_path, session_root, session_name, input_file_folder;
ofstream central_log_file, timing_log_file;
bool logExitSuccess;
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bool quit_after_bug_triggered;
char * sourceFileBinary; //the current source file gets read into this to be
manipulated--not that efficient
int _sizeOfSourceFileBinary;
string central_log_file_path, timing_log_file_path;
string cur_input_file;
int total_number_of_fuzzed_executions;
int total_crashes;
int initial_time; //time when the fuzzer starts
/*Initiates a fuzz session. A fuzz session will be associated with one
program and one log file, with associated results stored in a single
directory.
If the log file already exists, results will be appended to the end.*/
Fuzzer(string sut_path, string session_name, string session_root,
string input_file_folder, bool quit_after_bug_triggered);

~Fuzzer();

vector<string> createInputFileVector();

void fuzzInt(int sessions_per_file, int iterations_per_session);
vector<int> getIntegerInputFileContents(string file_path);
void fuzzFileMutate(vector<int>* session_file_contents);
int executeSUTWithInputs(vector<int>* session_file_contents);
int createRandomArgument(double interesting_argument_bias);
void fuzzChar(int sessions_per_file, int iterations_per_session);
vector<char> getCharInputFileContents(string file_path);
void fuzzFileMutate(vector<char>* session_file_contents);
int executeMinizWithInputs(vector<char>* session_file_contents);
char createRandomChar(double interesting_argument_bias);

void setLoggingSuccessfulExecutions(bool choice);

};
#endif /* FUZZER_HPP */
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fuzzer.cpp

#include "fuzzer.hpp"
using namespace std;
Fuzzer::Fuzzer(string sut_path, string session_name, string session_root,
string input_file_folder, bool quit_after_bug_triggered) {
logExitSuccess = false;
this->sut_path = sut_path;
this->session_root = session_root;
this->session_name = session_name;
this->input_file_folder = input_file_folder;
this->quit_after_bug_triggered = quit_after_bug_triggered;
this->central_log_file_path = session_root + "/" + session_name + ".details";
this->timing_log_file_path = session_root + "/" + session_name + ".timing";
srand(time(NULL));
total_number_of_fuzzed_executions = 0;
total_crashes = 0;
initial_time = time(NULL);
/*TODO: copy input files to this directory*/
//how to deal with naming conflicts--should be rare
/*
string dir = this->session_root + "/" + this->session_name;
int rename_count = 0;
while (mkdir(dir.c_str(), 0777) == -1) {
cerr << "mkdir failed" << endl;
session_name = session_name + "$";
dir = session_root + "/" + session_name;
rename_count++;
if (rename_count == 100) {
cerr << "inordinate number of renames; exiting failure" << endl;
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
//make the directory usable
chmod(dir.c_str(), 0777);
*/
//TODO check if directory exists
central_log_file.open(central_log_file_path.c_str(), ios::out | ios::app);
timing_log_file.open(timing_log_file_path.c_str(), ios::out | ios::app);
//write a confirmation to the log file
//check if the central log file is open
if (central_log_file.is_open() && timing_log_file.is_open())
central_log_file << "%%%%%Beginning session " << session_name << endl;
else {
cerr << strerror(errno) << endl;
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exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
Fuzzer::~Fuzzer() {
delete[] sourceFileBinary;
central_log_file.close();
}
void Fuzzer::setLoggingSuccessfulExecutions(bool choice) {
logExitSuccess = choice;
}
void Fuzzer::fuzzInt(int sessions_per_file, int iterations_per_session) {
//create an array of all the files in "input_file_folder"
vector<string> inputFileVector;
inputFileVector = createInputFileVector();
for (int cur_file_index = 0;
cur_file_index < inputFileVector.size(); cur_file_index++) {
//loadInputFileToMemory(inputfiles[currentfile])
vector<int> cur_file_contents;
cur_file_contents = getIntegerInputFileContents(input_file_folder + "/" +
inputFileVector.at(cur_file_index));
/*Having no arguments will cause arithmetic exceptions elsewhere in the
program.*/
if (!(cur_file_contents.size() > 0)) {
cerr << "The current input file contains no data. Continuing to the next one.
"
"Offending file: " << input_file_folder + "/" +
inputFileVector.at(cur_file_index) << endl;
continue;
}
cur_input_file = input_file_folder + "/" + inputFileVector.at(cur_file_index);
/*At the beginning of each session, we will always be working with
the original input file generated by crest-z3*/
for (int cur_session = 0; cur_session < sessions_per_file; cur_session++) {
/*Copy the unaltered input file that is in memory to a separate
location where it can be worked on*/
vector<int> session_file_contents = cur_file_contents;
for (int cur_iteration = 0; cur_iteration < iterations_per_session;
cur_iteration++) {
//modify one token of the input file
fuzzFileMutate(&session_file_contents);
//test our small example program on the newly generated inputs
executeSUTWithInputs(&session_file_contents);
}
}

55

}
}
/**
*
* @return a vector containing paths to all of the files in the specified
* input_file_folder
*/
vector<string> Fuzzer::createInputFileVector() {
DIR* dir;
struct dirent *ent;
string* str;
if ((dir = opendir(input_file_folder.c_str())) != NULL) {
/*Add all of the file paths to the vector to return*/
vector<string> file_paths;
while ((ent = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
str = new string(ent->d_name);
//skip hidden files and directories
if (str->at(0) == '.' || str->at(str->length() - 1) == '~')
continue;
file_paths.push_back(*str);
}
closedir(dir);
return file_paths;
} else {
cerr << "could not open directory " << input_file_folder << endl;
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
vector<int> Fuzzer::getIntegerInputFileContents(string file_path) {
ifstream input_file(file_path.c_str(), ios::in);
vector<int> file_contents;
//check that the file is open
if (input_file.is_open() == false) {
cerr << "Input file " << file_path << " failed to open" << endl;
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
int cur_int;
string line;
//make the file into a vector of ints
while (input_file.eof() == false) {
getline(input_file, line);
//corner case: we read in a blank line
if (line.size() == 0)
continue;
cur_int = atoi(line.c_str());
file_contents.push_back(cur_int);
}
input_file.close();
return file_contents;
}
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/** Mutates the inputs that we are providing to our sample program that takes
* a list of integers as input. This method haphazardly attempts to try the
* following interesting inputs more often than random ones: MAX_INT, MIN_INT,
* 0.
*
* @param session_file_contents The inputs to be mutated
*/
void Fuzzer::fuzzFileMutate(vector<int>* session_file_contents) {
int argument_to_fuzz = rand() % session_file_contents->size();
(*session_file_contents)[argument_to_fuzz] = createRandomArgument(0.01);
}
/**Returns a new integer with "interesting_argument_bias" chance of being
an "interesting" number. An "interesting number is INT_MAX, INT_MIN, or 0.
Otherwise, simply returns a random number.*/
int Fuzzer::createRandomArgument(double interesting_argument_bias) {
/*verify that interesting_argument_bias is between 0 and 1*/
if (!(interesting_argument_bias >= 0.00 && interesting_argument_bias <= 1.00)) {
cerr << "interesting_argument_bias was not in the range" <<
"[0.00, 1.00]" << endl;
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/*Chance of intentionally choosing an "interesting" value
RAND_MAX is the same as INT_MAX on this system*/
int chance = RAND_MAX * interesting_argument_bias;
//srand(time(NULL));
if (rand() < chance) { //return an "interesting" value
int r = rand() % 3;
switch (r) {
case 0:
return INT_MAX;
case 1:
return INT_MIN;
case 2:
return 0;
}
} else { //return an ordinary random value
/*rand() only returns positive ints, so we need to fix this*/
int r = rand() % 2;
switch (r) {
case 0:
return rand();
case 1:
return (-1) * rand();
}
}
}
int Fuzzer::executeSUTWithInputs(vector<int>* session_file_contents) {
const int MAX_ARG_SIZE = 128; //each argument can be 128 characters long
const int NUM_ARGS = 1 + session_file_contents->size();
int elapsed_time;
bool did_program_crash = false;
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pid_t child_pid; //process ID of the child process that will be spawned
int status; //if it is an error code, we write it down
/*allocate memory for each argument to be passed to the SUT*/
char* args[NUM_ARGS];
for (int i = 0; i < NUM_ARGS; i++) {
args[i] = (char*) malloc(sizeof (char) * MAX_ARG_SIZE);
}
/*copy the arguments from the vector to the character array*/
stringstream temp_string;
for (int cur_arg = 0; cur_arg < NUM_ARGS - 1; cur_arg++) {
temp_string.str(string()); //clear the stream
temp_string << (*session_file_contents)[cur_arg];
strcpy(args[cur_arg], temp_string.str().c_str());
}
/*null terminate the argument array*/
args[NUM_ARGS - 1] = (char *) 0;
elapsed_time = time(NULL) - initial_time;
child_pid = fork();
if (child_pid == 0) //child process
{
execv(sut_path.c_str(), args);
} else if (child_pid < 0) //failed to fork
{
cerr << "Failed to fork" << endl;
} else //parent process
{
do {
//Don't block waiting and report the status of stopped children
int w = waitpid(child_pid, &status, WUNTRACED | WCONTINUED);
if (w == -1) {
cerr << "waitpid returned -1" << endl;
goto breakwaitloop;
}
if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
cout << "exited, status=" << WEXITSTATUS(status) << endl;
timing_log_file << elapsed_time << "\t" <<
total_crashes << "\t" <<
total_number_of_fuzzed_executions << endl;
} else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) //process was terminated by OS
{
did_program_crash = true;
int crash_id = rand();
total_crashes++;
timing_log_file << "<crash id=" << crash_id << "> "
<< elapsed_time << " </crash>\t" << total_crashes
<< "\t" << total_number_of_fuzzed_executions << endl;
/*Record the following:
1. The output that caused the program to crash
2. The wall clock time at which it crashed
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3. The kill signal
4. TODO: The location of the crash dump*/
cout << "%%%Program killed by signal " << WTERMSIG(status) << endl;
int kill_signal = WTERMSIG(status);
central_log_file
central_log_file
</num_arguments>" << endl;
central_log_file
central_log_file
central_log_file
<< endl;
central_log_file
"</input_file_name>" << endl;

<< "<crash>" << endl;
<< "\t<num_arguments> " << NUM_ARGS - 1 << "
<< "\t<sut_path> " << sut_path << "</sut_path>" << endl;
<< "\t<time> " << elapsed_time << "</time>" << endl;
<< "\t<kill_signal> " << kill_signal << "</kill_signal>"
<< "\t<input_file_name> " << cur_input_file <<

//print the arguments on separate lines for easy processing
central_log_file << "\t<argument>" << endl;
for (int cur_arg = 0; cur_arg < NUM_ARGS - 1; cur_arg++) {
central_log_file << "\t\t" << (*session_file_contents)[cur_arg] <<
endl;
}
central_log_file << "\t</argument>" << endl;
central_log_file << "</crash>" << endl;
/*crashing a program takes a relatively long time--repeated
executions will likely crash again and again at the same
spot*/
if (quit_after_bug_triggered)
goto breakwaitloop;
} else if (WIFSTOPPED(status)) {
cout << "stopped by signal " << WSTOPSIG(status) << endl;
} else if (WIFCONTINUED(status)) {
cout << "continued" << endl;
}
} while (!WIFEXITED(status) && !WIFSIGNALED(status));
breakwaitloop:
;
}
for (int i = 0; i < NUM_ARGS; i++) {
free(args[i]);
}

total_number_of_fuzzed_executions++;

return did_program_crash;
}
void Fuzzer::fuzzChar(int sessions_per_file, int iterations_per_session) {

59

//create an array of all the files in "input_file_folder"
vector<string> inputFileVector;
inputFileVector = createInputFileVector();
//for each input file provided
for (int cur_file_index = 0;
cur_file_index < inputFileVector.size(); cur_file_index++) {
//loadInputFileToMemory(inputfiles[currentfile])
vector<char> cur_file_contents;
cur_file_contents = getCharInputFileContents(input_file_folder + "/" +
inputFileVector.at(cur_file_index));
/*Having no arguments will cause arithmetic exceptions elsewhere in the
program.*/
if (!(cur_file_contents.size() > 0)) {
cerr << "The current input file contains no data. Continuing to the next one.
"
"Offending file: " << input_file_folder + "/" +
inputFileVector.at(cur_file_index) << endl;
continue;
}
cur_input_file = input_file_folder + "/" + inputFileVector.at(cur_file_index);
/*At the beginning of each session, we will always be working with
the original input file generated by crest-z3*/
for (int cur_session = 0; cur_session < sessions_per_file; cur_session++) {
/*Copy the unaltered input file that is in memory to a separate
location where it can be worked on*/
vector<char> session_file_contents = cur_file_contents;
for (int cur_iteration = 0; cur_iteration < iterations_per_session;
cur_iteration++) {
//modify one token of the input file
fuzzFileMutate(&session_file_contents);
//test our small example program on the newly generated inputs
executeMinizWithInputs(&session_file_contents);
}
}
}
}
vector<char> Fuzzer::getCharInputFileContents(string file_path) {
ifstream input_file(file_path.c_str(), ios::in);
vector<char> file_contents;
//check that the file is open
if (input_file.is_open() == false) {
cerr << "Input file " << file_path << " failed to open" << endl;
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
//make the input string into
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char c;
while (input_file.good()) {
c = input_file.get();
if (c != EOF)
file_contents.push_back(c);
else
break;
}
input_file.close();
return file_contents;
}
void Fuzzer::fuzzFileMutate(vector<char>* session_file_contents) {
int argument_to_fuzz = rand() % session_file_contents->size();
(*session_file_contents)[argument_to_fuzz] = createRandomChar(0.3);
}
char Fuzzer::createRandomChar(double interesting_argument_bias) {
/*verify that interesting_argument_bias is between 0 and 1*/
if (!(interesting_argument_bias >= 0.00 && interesting_argument_bias <= 1.00)) {
cerr << "interesting_argument_bias was not in the range" <<
"[0.00, 1.00]" << endl;
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/*Chance of intentionally choosing an "interesting" value
RAND_MAX is the same as INT_MAX on this system*/
int chance = RAND_MAX * interesting_argument_bias;
//srand(time(NULL));
if (rand() < chance) { //return an "interesting" value
int r = rand() % 3;
switch (r) {
case 0:
return CHAR_MAX;
case 1:
return CHAR_MIN;
case 2:
return 0;
}
} else { //return an ordinary random value
/*rand() only returns positive ints, so we need to fix this*/
int r = rand() % 2;
switch (r) {
case 0:
return (char) rand();
case 1:
return (-1) * ((char) rand());
}
}
}
/*We will always be providing miniz with just one argument: the string
to compress*/
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int Fuzzer::executeMinizWithInputs(vector<char>* session_file_contents) {
const int NUM_ARGS = 2;
int elapsed_time;
bool did_program_crash = false;
pid_t child_pid; //process ID of the child process that will be spawned
int status; //if it is an error code, we write it down
/*allocate memory for each argument to be passed to the SUT*/
char* args[NUM_ARGS];
args[0] = (char*) malloc(sizeof (char) * (session_file_contents->size() + 1));
/*copy the arguments from the vector to the character array*/
stringstream temp_string;
temp_string.str(string()); //clear the stream
for (int i = 0; i < session_file_contents->size(); i++)
temp_string << (*session_file_contents)[i];
memcpy(args[0], temp_string.str().c_str(), temp_string.str().size());
/*null terminate the argument array*/
args[NUM_ARGS - 1] = (char *) 0;
//execute the program
elapsed_time = time(NULL) - initial_time;
child_pid = fork();
if (child_pid == 0) //child process
{
execv(sut_path.c_str(), args);
} else if (child_pid < 0) //failed to fork
{
cerr << "Failed to fork" << endl;
} else //parent process
{
do {
//Don't block waiting and report the status of stopped children
int w = waitpid(child_pid, &status, WUNTRACED | WCONTINUED);
if (w == -1) {
cerr << "waitpid returned -1" << endl;
goto breakwaitloop;
}
if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
cout << "exited, status=" << WEXITSTATUS(status) << endl;
timing_log_file << elapsed_time << "\t" <<
total_crashes << "\t" <<
total_number_of_fuzzed_executions << endl;
} else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) //process was terminated by OS
{
did_program_crash = true;
int crash_id = rand();
total_crashes++;
timing_log_file << "<crash id=" << crash_id << "> "
<< elapsed_time << " </crash>\t" << total_crashes
<< "\t" << total_number_of_fuzzed_executions << endl;
/*Record the following:

62

1. The output that caused the program to crash
2. The wall clock time at which it crashed
3. The kill signal
4. TODO: The location of the crash dump*/
cout << "%%%Program killed by signal " << WTERMSIG(status) << endl;
int kill_signal = WTERMSIG(status);
central_log_file
central_log_file
</num_arguments>" << endl;
central_log_file
central_log_file
central_log_file
<< endl;
central_log_file
"</input_file_name>" << endl;

<< "<crash>" << endl;
<< "\t<num_arguments> " << NUM_ARGS - 1 << "
<< "\t<sut_path> " << sut_path << "</sut_path>" << endl;
<< "\t<time> " << elapsed_time << "</time>" << endl;
<< "\t<kill_signal> " << kill_signal << "</kill_signal>"
<< "\t<input_file_name> " << cur_input_file <<

//print the arguments on separate lines for easy processing
central_log_file << "\t<argument> ";
for(int i = 0; i < session_file_contents->size(); i++)
central_log_file << (*session_file_contents)[i];
central_log_file << endl;
central_log_file << " </argument>" << endl;
central_log_file << "</crash>" << endl;
/*crashing a program takes a relatively long time--repeated
executions will likely crash again and again at the same
spot*/
if (quit_after_bug_triggered)
goto breakwaitloop;
} else if (WIFSTOPPED(status)) {
cout << "stopped by signal " << WSTOPSIG(status) << endl;
} else if (WIFCONTINUED(status)) {
cout << "continued" << endl;
}
} while (!WIFEXITED(status) && !WIFSIGNALED(status));
breakwaitloop:
;
}
for (int i = 0; i < NUM_ARGS; i++) {
free(args[i]);
}
total_number_of_fuzzed_executions++;
return did_program_crash;
}
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